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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
BANKS AND BANKING-FUNCTIONS AND DEALINGS--WHETHER BANK's
LIABILITY FOR PAYING A FORGED CHECK IS ABSOLUTELY LImiTED BY STATUTORY DUTY

OF

DEPOSITOR TO NOTIFY BANK OF FORGERY WITHIN ONE YEAR

AFTER RETURN OF VOUCHER-Banks paying out under forged checks have
been offered greater protection as a result of the decision in Gerber v.

Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago.1 Therein,
the defendant bank paid a check signed by unauthorized persons in con1 16 Ill. App. (2d) 379, 148 N. E. (2d) 597 (1958).
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travention of signature cards in its files and then returned the voucher
to those same persons who had, in the interim, become officers of the plaintiff depositor. The plaintiff sued to recover the amount of the forged
check 2 which had been charged to its account. The defense was that the
plaintiff had failed to notify the defendant of the forgery within one year
after the return of the voucher as required by the so-called Liability for
Forged and Raised Checks Act.3 On appeal, the Appellate Court for the
First District of Illinois affirmed the judgment for defendant. In so
doing it held that receipt of the voucher by an officer of the plaintiff was
sufficient to impose an absolute duty to notify the defendant of the forgery
within one year so that it could proceed to enforce restitution from the
forger.
The plaintiff's action was predicated on its contract of deposit with
the defendant, which permitted the defendant to charge the plaintiff's
account only on its authentic order. According to the terms of the contract, the bank was absolutely liable if it charged a forged check to the
depositor's account. 4 The common law, however, attached a duty upon
the depositor to use reasonable care in detecting any mistake made by the
bank.5 And, if the depositor failed to perform that duty, the common
law absolved the bank from liability. 6 But an exception to this rule of
the common law was that the bank would retain its liability if it had
been negligent in charging the forged check to the depositor's account.7
In this case, the defendant was negligent in charging the forged check
to the plaintiff's account because it had prior constructive notice of the
forgery through the resolutions and signature cards on file with it. Therefore, at common law, the exception would have applied and the defendant
2 In an earlier appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois held
that signing a check without authority amounted to forgery, but reversed the
decision of the trial court for the defendant and remanded the case to enable the
plaintiff to file a reply to the defendant's answer and special defenses. Barrett v.
Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, 2 Ill. App. (2d)
70, 118 N. E. (2d) 631 (1954). In both appeals, the plaintiff was the Director of
Insurance of the State of Illinois, acting in his capacity as liquidator of the United
States Mutual Insurance Company. The change in personnel in the office of
Director of Insurance explains the change in the name of the plaintiff in the
second appeal.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 1, Ch. 16 , § 24, provides that a depositor can hold its
bank liable for paying a forged check only if it notifies the bank that the check
so paid is forged within one year after the return of the voucher.
4 People v. Dunham, 344 Ill. 268, 176 N. E. 325 (1931): Dalmatinsko, etc. v.
First Union T. & S. Bank, 268 Ill. App. 314 (1932) ; Chicago Savings Bank v. Block,
126 Ill. App. 128 (1906).
5 Cosmopolitan Bank v. Lake Shore Bank, 343 Ill. 34-7, 175 N. E. 583 (1931):
Moore & Co. v. Champaign Nat. Bank. 13 Ill. App. (2d) 97 (1957); Phillip v.
First Nat. Bank, 297 Ill. App. 498, 15 N. E. (2d) 57 (1939).
6 Folsom v. Northern Trust Co., 237 Ill. App. 419 (1925): Osborn v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago, 218 Ill. App. -8 (1920) ; Findlay v. Corn Ex. Nat'l.
B'k., 166 111. App. 57 (1911).
7 Illinois Tuberculosis Ass'n. v. Springfield Marine Bank. 282 Ill. App. 14 (1935).
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would have been liable even though the plaintiff failed to use reasonable
care.
However, the problem is further complicated by the statutory provision which imposes a duty on the depositor to give notice to the bank within
one year after the return of the voucher as a condition subsequent to holding
the bank liable. The notice requirement may be regarded as a condition
subsequent because its effect is to adjust the common law liability by discharging the bank upon the depositor's failure to give notice. It cannot
be viewed as a condition precedent because the cause of action existed
at common law and was not created by the statute. Nor can it be treated
as a statute of limitation because the action can be brought after one year
if notice is given. Although the precise point has not been previously
decided, the condition imposed would seem to require actual notice. The
legislature appears to have expressed this intent by placing a duty on
the depositor to take positive action by requiring him to give notice
within one year after the return of the voucher. The provision requiring
notice after the return of the voucher seems consistent with the purposes
of the statute except insofar as it does not provide for the situation where
actual notice was given after the check was paid but prior to the return
of the voucher. In that situation, the bank would get even greater protection because it would be able to proceed against the forger more quickly.
But it would seem that the requirement of the provision under discussion
is not fulfilled by prior constructive notice because such notice could not
result in the bank's discovering its mistake and it could not proceed
against the forger until it discovered its mistakeS
The plaintiff contended that the statute was not applicable where it
had given all the notice it could be reasonably expected to give under the
circumstances. The plaintiff's position rests upon the general principle
of agency law that where the agent's interest is adverse to that of the
principal, notice to the agent will not be imputed to the principal.9 And,
in the present case, it appears that the agents' interests were opposed to
the interests of the plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme Court gave effect to
the principle here involved in the case of The Merchants' National Bank
8 The courts of other states, construing similar statutes, have confirmed this conclusion. The Supreme Court of Kansas decided that the bank is not liable under
any circumstances unless it is notified within the statutory period by the depositor:
Herbel v. Peoples State Bank of Ellinwood, 170 Kan. 620, 228 P. (2d) 929 (1951).
Also, the Supreme Court of South Dakota found that, irrespective of its knowledge
of facts or of its negligence, the bank is not liable when the depositor fails to give
notice within the statutory period: Flaherty Bros. v. The Bank of Kimball, 7.5
S. D. 468, 68 N. W. (2d) 105 (1955).
9 Neagle v. McMullen, 334 Ill. 168, 165 N. E. 605 (1929) : Seaverns v. Presbyterian
Hospital. 173 Il. 414. 50 N. E. 1079 (1898) : In re Estate of Wedelius, 266 Il1. App.
69 (1932).
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of Peoria v. The Nichols & Shepard Company.10 However, in that case,
the agent was a mere sales representative whereas, in the principal case,
the agents were the officers of the plaintiff. The cases are distinguishable
because officers are charged with the management of a corporation's daily
affairs and are vested with more discretion than a mere sales representative.
The analogy is further weakened because the forgers had since become
authorized signers, although that information had not yet been communicated to the bank. It would appear that the defendant was correct in
returning the voucher to the officers because the only other apparent alternative was to return it to the board of directors which met only intermittently and which was effectively incapable of receiving it."
The statute, by imposing an absolute duty, placed an extreme limit
upon the period during which the depositor could perfect its cause of
action and thus offered the bank an opportunity to seek restitution seasonably. It, in effect, provided that the account between the depositor
and the bank became an account stated no later than one year after the
return of the voucher unless the depositor gave notice within that period.
The statute enhances the equities between the parties because its effect
was to give the bank a definite advantage which it did not previously
possess. On the other hand, it works no particular hardship on the depositor by imposing the duty of giving notice within one year. While this
requirement is inconsistent with the common law of Illinois, the only
real obstacle to its easy fulfillment is the carelessness of the depositor in
managing its own affairs.
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DENIAL

OF

LOYALTY CLEARANCES MAY BE BASED ON FACELESS INFORMER EVIDENCE-

Much recent controversy has centered on the problem of whether or not a
person working with classified government material can be denied a loyalty
clearance through an administrative proceeding in which he is not allowed
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The "cold war" has
tended to accentuate the issues presented, so that both sides of the controversy have now been fully represented by vigorous exponents. Typically
this problem has embraced two classes of individuals who have been denied
loyalty clearances; those engaged in governmental projects who are privately employed by firms working on government contracts, and those
employed directly by the government.
10223 Il. 41, 79 N. E. 38 (1906).
11 A case from another jurisdiction supports this conclusion.

The Court of Ap-

peals of New York held that when vouchers are returned to the president of the

depositor, they have been returned to the depositor within the meaning of the
New York statute: Shattuck v. Guardian Trust Co. of New York, 204 N. Y. 200,
97 N. E. 517 (1912).

